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THE SAME SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE FOR 
DUMMIES: A BREAKDOWN OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
Marc Anthony Consalo* 
June 8, 1977: Florida Governor Rubin Askew signed a bill which 
banned same-sex couples from getting married or adopting children 
in the State of Florida.1 
May 29, 1997: Florida Governor Lawton Chiles withdrew his 
opposition to a bill that becomes law banning the State of Florida 
from recognizing same-sex marriages.2 
November 4, 2008: By a sixty-two percent margin, Florida voters 
passed a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage 
within the state.3 
February 28, 2014: Jim Brenner and Chuck Jones file suit against 
Governor Rick Scott demanding that the state recognize their 2009 
marriage from Canada.4 
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 1 Rene Stutzman, Key Day For Same-Sex Marriage in Florida, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
(2015), available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-gay-
marriage-florida-timeline-20150105-story.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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July 17, 2014–August 5, 2014: Judges from Monroe, Miami-Dade, 
Broward and Palm Beach counties independently ruled Florida’s 
ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional but stay enforcement 
of their rulings for appeals.5 
August 21, 2014: United States District Judge Robert Hinkle ruled 
in Brenner v. Scott that Florida’s ban on same sex marriage is 
unconstitutional: he stayed his ruling but also puts a cap on how 
long it will last—ninety days after the United States Supreme Court 
weighs in on state same-sex marriage bans.6 
Oct. 6, 2014: The United States Supreme Court refused to take up 
Brenner v. Scott, triggering Judge Hinkle’s ninety-day countdown 
to same-sex marriage in Florida on January 6th.7 
January 6, 2015: Same-sex marriages became legal in the State of 
Florida.8 
The above timeline offers a glimpse of the ups and downs that the 
same sex marriage debate has faced on its road to legalization in the 
State of Florida. It is important to understand that at the time of writing 
this article while currently legal, same-sex marriage still faces challenges 
in both the Eleventh Federal Judicial Circuit and potentially the United 
States Supreme Court.9 No matter what decision the courts ultimately 
reach on the topic, like the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s, it is 
important to understand the conflict as it shapes not only our legal 
landscape but also our future as Floridians. 
This article will attempt to break down the debate between 
opponents and proponents of same-sex marriage. It will begin by briefing 
the cases of Loving v. Virginia and United States v. Windsor.10 These 
cases are cited repeatedly as grounds for the decision to invalidate same 
sex-marriage bans.11 Next, this article will explain the opponent’s 
position in support of a ban against same-sex marriage, and the 
                                                                                                                                     
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (2014). 
 7 Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1294; Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 (2014); 
Stutzman, supra note 1. 
 8 Stutzman, supra note 1. 
 9 See Matt Ford, The Supreme Court Will Decide If ‘Gay Marriage’ is Just 
‘Marriage’, THE ATLANTIC, (2015), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2015/01/Supreme-Court-to-Hear-Four-Cases-on-Same-Sex-
Marriage/384610/. 
 10 See 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 11 See Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1289–91. 
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proponent’s opposing arguments against the ban. Finally, this article will 
provide an analysis of the Brenner v. Scott12 decision, its implications for 
the State of Florida, and its potential path to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
LOVING V. VIRGINIA, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
It is ironic that the paramount case used in support of same-sex 
marriage involves a party named Loving.13 The case centered on the 
relationship between seventeen-year-old Mildred Jeter, who was black, 
and her childhood sweetheart, twenty-three-year-old white construction 
worker, Richard Loving.14 The two resided in Virginia, but journeyed to 
Washington D.C. in 1958 to be wed.15 After the ceremony, they returned 
to Virginia to live as a married couple.16 At the time, the State of 
Virginia had outlawed marriage between blacks and whites—known as 
“miscegenation” laws—the couple risked arrest and imprisonment due to 
their relationship.17 
In October of 1958, a grand jury was empaneled to investigate the 
Lovings.18 Soon after, the grand jury issued an indictment, which 
charged the Lovings with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial 
marriages.19 Left with no alternatives, on January 6, 1959, the Lovings 
pleaded guilty to the charge.20 They were sentenced to one year in jail; 
suspended on the condition that the Lovings leave Virginia and not 
return for twenty-five years.21 In rendering his decision, the trial judge 
stated the following at the time of sentencing: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but for the 
interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for 
such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he 
did not intend for the races to mix.22 
The focus of the Lovings’ convictions centered on sections 258 and 
259 of the Virginia Code.23  Section 258 read: 
                                                                                                                                     
 12 Id. at 1278. 
 13 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
 14 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 3. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 4–5. 
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Leaving State to evade law.—If  any white person and colored 
person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, 
and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and 
afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, 
they shall be punished as provided in § 20–59, and the marriage 
shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in 
this State.  The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife 
shall be evidence of their marriage.24 
Section 259, which provided what the penalty for miscegenation 
would be, stated: “Punishment for marriage. — If any white person 
intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with 
a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five 
years.”25 After their conviction, the Lovings moved to Washington 
D.C.26 On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the Virginia state 
court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence.27 Their argument 
centered on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.28 The 
trial court took no action on the motion, therefore, on October 28, 1964, 
the Lovings initiated a class action lawsuit.29 It was filed in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.30 The suit asked 
that a three-judge panel be convened to review the statutes and find 
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional.31 The Lovings 
also sought an injunction against state officials preventing the 
enforcement of their convictions.32 
On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the November 6, 
1963 motion to vacate.33 The Lovings appealed this decision to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.34 On February 11, 1965, the court 
in the class action suit stayed its case to allow the Lovings to present 
their constitutional claims to the highest state court.35 The Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the state trial court’s decision.36 It 
upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and 
                                                                                                                                     
 24 Id. at 4. 
 25 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 26 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 3–4. 
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affirmed their sentences.37 The Lovings appealed this decision to the 
United States Supreme Court.38 
In April 1967, the United States Supreme Court heard the parties’ 
arguments.39 The issue presented to the Court was whether statutes 
preventing marriages between individuals of different races violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.40 The Court ruled that the statutes were unconstitutional.41 
In making its decision, the Court addressed Virginia’s concerns that the 
regulation of marriage was a state’s rights issue, and that only the states 
held this power under the Tenth Amendment.42 While the Court 
conceded that a state does have police powers to regulate marriage, those 
powers still must comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.43 Virginia’s argument was that indeed, its “miscegenation” 
laws did comply with such federal regulations as it punished whites and 
blacks equally for the crime.44 
The second argument by Virginia was that even if the Equal 
Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes, because of 
their reliance on racial classifications, there was still a rational basis for a 
state to discriminate against interracial marriages.45 Virginia conceded 
there was lack of scientific evidence on the issue, but asked that the 
Court “defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy 
of discouraging interracial marriages.”46 
The Court rejected Virginia’s argument that any rational basis for 
the statute should result in its survival.47 A clear distinction had been 
made in precedent regarding the analysis of laws concerning 
discrimination based on race or other defining characteristics.48 In 
Loving, it was clear that the only discernable quality used to outlaw the 
marriage between a white man and a black woman was the color of their 
skin.49 Thus, in recognizing this fundamental truth regarding Virginia’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 37 Id. 
 38 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4. 
 39 Id. at 1. 
 40 Id. at 2. 
 41 Id. at 12. 
 42 Id. at 7. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 10–12. 
 49 Id. at 11. 
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“miscegenation” laws, the Court announced that the right to marry was a 
fundamental right guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution.50 
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to 
our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as 
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, 
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all 
the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to 
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed 
by the State.51 
UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, 133 S. CT. 2675 (2013). 
In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were lawfully married in 
Ontario, Canada.52 They had been a couple since the early 1960’s and 
registered as domestic partners in New York in 1993.53 Soon after their 
wedding, the two returned to New York to cohabitate as a married 
couple.54 Sadly, Spyer passed away in 2009.55 At the time of her death, 
she left her entire estate to Windsor.56 Windsor sought to utilize the 
estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, which excludes from taxation 
“any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to 
his surviving spouse.”57 This would have enabled her to avoid paying 
over $363,000.00 to the government; however, she was unable to do so 
under federal law.58 The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) excluded 
same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse” as that term is used in 
federal statutes.59 Specifically, Section Three of DOMA reads: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ 
                                                                                                                                     
 50 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 51 Id. 
 52 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
 53 Id. at 2683. 
 54 Id. at 2682–83. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2015). 
 58 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682–83. 
 59 Id. at 2682. 
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means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.60 
Windsor paid the taxes as instructed, but filed suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of the code; specifically, its limitation of the definition 
of the term marriage.61 She argued that DOMA violated the guarantee of 
equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.62 
While the lawsuit was pending, the Attorney General of the United 
States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the 
Department of Justice would not defend the lawsuit, all but alluding to 
the unconstitutionality of Section Three of DOMA.63 Although “the 
President . . . instructed the Department not to defend the statute in 
Windsor,”64 he also decided, “that Section [Three] will continue to be 
enforced by the Executive Branch” and that the United States had an 
“interest in providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate 
in the litigation of those cases.”65 
In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the 
House of Representatives voted to intervene in the litigation and decided 
that it would defend the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA.66 
Eventually, the District Court permitted BLAG to intervene as an 
interested party.67 On appeal, the United States District Court and the 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Windsor by finding Section Three of 
DOMA unconstitutional.68 They ordered the United States government to 
refund Windsor’s money.69 After hearing arguments from both sides, the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.70 
In reaching this decision, the Court began by pointing out that the 
State of New York already recognized same-sex marriages performed in 
other jurisdictions.71 Therefore, the legality of Windsor’s marriage was 
not at issue.72 The fact that New York recognized same-sex marriages 
                                                                                                                                     
 60 Id. at 2683. 
 61 Id. at 2683. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 65 Id. at 2684. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695-2696. 
 71 Id. at 2689. 
 72 Id. 
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also illustrated the belief held by many, the states should regulate this 
domain, not the Federal Government.73 
However, the Court was quick to reject this contention pointing out 
that during the same year it had affirmed a decision to allow a former 
spouse to retain life insurance proceeds under a federal program that 
gave her priority over the current wife by a second marriage.74 This was 
an ideal example of the Federal Government preempting state law on the 
relationship of a husband and a wife and gave the Federal Government 
the ability to intervene in the instant case.75 This case set a clear 
precedent for the argument that the Federal Government may trump the 
state’s interest in regulating domestic relationships, clearly negating any 
Tenth Amendment issue.76 Other precedents also existed involving 
federal laws governing marriages and families.77 For instance, under 8 
U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1), immigration law invalidated marriages “entered 
into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United 
States] as an immigrant.”78 Also, Congress ordered that while state law 
would determine who qualifies as an applicant’s spouse in establishing 
income-based criteria for social security benefits, common-law marriages 
would also be recognized, even though they may be illegal in a given 
state.79 Therefore, while the Court admitted domestic law historically had 
been the sole province of the states, it did so with the understanding that 
federal constitutional protections and guarantees would still be 
honored.80 
In the Windsor case, the Court found that federal regulation did just 
the opposite.81 Section Three of DOMA ignored constitutional 
protections and negated New York’s attempt to ensure equal protection 
to same-sex couples.82 In the Court’s own words, “DOMA writes 
inequality into the entire United States Code.”83 The Court further 
explained these inequalities that DOMA placed on same sex couples.84 
Through its enactment, not only did DOMA prevent same-sex couples 
from enjoying the surviving-spouse exemption through inheritance laws 
                                                                                                                                     
 73 See id. at 2690. 
 74 Id. at 2690 (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013)). 
 75 Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 
(2001)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690. 
 78 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2006). 
 79 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2). 
 80 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690. 
 81 Id. at 2693. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 2694. 
 84 Id. 
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but also deprived them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special protections for 
domestic-support obligations.85 Additionally, same-sex couples had to 
adhere to a much more complicated procedure to file state and federal 
taxes jointly.86 For same-sex couples that had a partner working for the 
Federal Government, DOMA robbed them of specific protections for 
crimes such as assault, kidnapping, and murder of “a member of the 
immediate family.”87 DOMA also negatively affected children of same-
sex couples.88 It increased healthcare costs for families by taxing health 
benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses and it 
denied benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and 
parent.89 
Surprisingly, BLAG did not back down from this negative 
characterization of DOMA nor of its inherently discriminatory purpose 
in fighting to uphold the law.90 In fact, the Court remarked that BLAG 
was “candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere 
with state sovereign choices about who may be married.”91 A plain 
reading of the law’s title illustrates that its purpose was to discourage 
states from legalizing same-sex marriage and to further restrict same-sex 
couples’ freedoms, if any state had the audacity to pass such a law.92 
“The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to 
recognize same-sex marriages, the union will be treated as second-class 
marriages for purposes of federal law.”93 For the Court, this was the 
clearest evidence of the unconstitutionality of the Act.94 
The Court concluded that Congress could not enact a law to further 
its personal views on what marriage should or should not be.95 In doing 
so, the protections of Due Process were violated.96 Because the purpose 
of DOMA was simply to “demean” same-sex couples.97 The Court found 
no legitimate purpose that could overcome the blatant and unapologetic 
attempt to disparage and injure those whom New York wanted to protect 
by recognizing their union as married persons.98 
                                                                                                                                     
 85 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § § 101(14A), 507(a)(1)(A), 523(a)(5), 523(a)(15). 
 86 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 87 Id. at 2694–2695. 
 88 Id. at 2695. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 2693. 
 91 Id. at 2693. 
 92 Windsor, 133 S. Ct.  at 2693–2694. 
 93 Id. at 2693–2694. 
 94 Id. at 2694. 
 95 See id. at 2694–95. 
 96 Id. at 2694. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95 
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The second to final line of the majority opinion is quite telling. 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to 
those lawful marriages.”99 By doing so, with one pen stroke, he left open 
the debate over same sex marriages. Yes, the Federal Government could 
not limit marriages between a man and a woman; but could states still 
choose to do so? Windsor and Spyer enjoyed the protections of the State 
of New York and willingly provided them by recognizing their marriage 
as legal.100 
THE DEBATE 
It is with this backdrop that we frame the debate between opponents 
and proponents of same-sex marriage. Before we begin to take sides on 
this highly contentious issue, it is necessary to dispel a common myth 
held by most individuals. That myth requires a basic understanding of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Simply put, the 
Government, whether at the federal level or state level, can 
discriminate.101 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution does not prevent discrimination.102 Rather, it simply sets  the 
rules and standards that must be observed when the government chooses 
to discriminate.103 The greatest importance of this debate is that states 
can prevent individuals from marrying.104 For instance, many states 
prevent first cousins from wedding.105 Therefore, the question is not if 
states can discriminate, but rather when they can discriminate when it 
comes to marriage. 
As it applies to the same-sex marriage debate, the Loving case has 
taught us that the right to marry is a fundamental right guaranteed to 
citizens of all states by the Federal Constitution.106 According to the 
Supreme Court in Loving, enumerated rights that are incorporated are so 
fundamental that any law restricting such a right must both serve a 
compelling state purpose and be narrowly tailored to that compelling 
purpose. As such, the same-sex marriage debate focuses squarely on one 
major question: what compelling government interest exists to prevent 
same-sex couples from marrying each other? 
                                                                                                                                     
 99 Id. at 2696. 
 100 Id. at 2683. 
 101 See Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1943). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
 105 DeBoer v. Synder, 772 F.3d 388, 413 (6th Cir. 2014); see Diane B. Paul & Hamish 
G. Spencer, “It’s Ok, We’re Not Cousins by Blood”: The Cousin Marriage Controversy 
in Historical Perspective, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2627, 2627 (2008). 
 106 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
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Opponents of Same Sex Marriage 
Opponents of same-sex marriage assert two reasons to satisfy the 
requirement of a compelling government interest in the Loving case. The 
first is the argument that the primary purpose of marriage is 
procreation.107 The second is that permitting same-sex marriage 
encourages violation of sodomy laws.108 They believe it would be 
impossible for same-sex couples to express intimacy without violating 
criminal laws illegalizing sodomy.109 
Courts have long held that a connection exists between marriage 
and procreation.110 For instance, in 1888, the United States Supreme 
Court took the case of Maynard v. Hill where a question arose as to the 
intestate succession of a husband’s estate and the ability of a legislature 
to enact laws dealing with divorce.111 There, the Court took the 
opportunity to argue that marriage is much more than a mere contract 
between two consenting adults.112 The court remarked that marriage “is 
the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress.”113 Less than 100 years later in the 
case of Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme 
Court again chose to speak on the connection of marriage and 
procreation when entertaining an appeal on Oklahoma’s criminal 
sterilization law.114 In that case, Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of 
the Court writing, “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”115 Language exists in the Loving 
case professing this connection when the Court signaled that marriage 
was “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”116 Finally, as 
recently as 1978, the Supreme Court implied that marriage was “the 
foundation of the family and of society,” through the case of Zablocki v. 
Redhail.117 
Before 1962, every state classified sodomy as a felony punished by 
lengthy prison sentences.118 However, by 1986, when the United States 
                                                                                                                                     
 107 See Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., Dissenting). 
 108 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., Dissenting); id. at 605. 
 109 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 110 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718. 
 111 Maynard v. Hill, 125 US 190, 193, 203 (1888). 
 112 Id. at 205. 
 113 Id. at 211. 
 114 Skinner v. State, 316 US 535, 536 (1942). 
 115 Id. at 541. 
 116 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 117 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Marynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190, 211 (1888)). 
 118 Don Gilleland, Guest Column: 50 Years of Change, Shifts in Culture Not Always 
Predictable, FLORIDA TODAY (Jan 2, 2013, 11:23 AM), available at 
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Supreme Court took up the constitutionality of sodomy laws in the case 
of Bowers v. Hardwick119, approximately twenty-five states had legalized 
the practice in some form.120 Yet in the Bowers case, the Supreme Court 
chose to uphold the constitutionality of the law that made sodomy 
illegal.121 The case focused on a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral 
and anal sex in private between consenting adults when applied to 
homosexuals.122 
In August 1982, an Atlanta police officer cited Hardwick for public 
drinking.123 Hardwick failed to appear in court for the citation and in 
response the court issued an arrest warrant.124 Officers went to 
Hardwick’s apartment to serve the warrant and found him having 
consensual oral sex with another man.125 Police arrested both men for 
sodomy, which was defined in Georgia law to include both oral sex and 
anal sex between members of the same or opposite sex.126 Surprisingly, 
the local district attorney did not pursue the charges.127 Therefore, 
Hardwick decided to sue Michael Bowers, the Attorney General for 
Georgia.128 He sued in federal court to declare the State’s sodomy law 
invalid.129 In his pleadings, Hardwick claimed that as a “practicing 
homosexual” he would eventually be prosecuted for his activities.130 
Additionally, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) became 
involved in the case.131 
Initially, Hardwick filed in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia, where it was dismissed, with the Court 
ruling in favor of Attorney General Bowers.132 Hardwick then appealed 
that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20130103/COLUMNISTS0205/301030003/Guest-
column-50-years-change (last visited September 20, 2015). 
 119 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 188 (1986). 
 120 Id. at 196. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at187–88. 
 123 Claude J. Summers & Craig Kazcorowski, Bowers v. Hardwock / Lawrence v. 
Texas, GLBTQ: An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer 
Culture (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.glbtq.com/socialsciences 
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 127 Bowers, 478 US at 187–88. 
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 130 Id. at 188. 
 131 SUMMERS ET AL., supra note 123. 
 132 Bowers, 478 US at 186. 
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Circuit.133 that the District Court’s ruling was reversed and Georgia’s 
sodomy statute was deemed unconstitutional.134 The State of Georgia 
then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.135 The United 
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State of Georgia.136 In 
reaching their decision, the Court did not question the wisdom or legality 
of the act of sodomy; rather the focus was on a state’s ability to pass laws 
criminalizing the activity.137 More specifically, “[t]he issue presented is 
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”138 The Court found no right 
existed.139 
Proponents of Same Sex Marriage 
Proponents are quick to point out flaws with the conservative view 
in support of the ban on same sex marriage.140 In their minds, the purpose 
of marriage being procreation lacks merit.141 For these individuals, 
couples become married for a large variety of reasons that have nothing 
to do with children.142 Some of these reasons include health insurance, 
federal benefits, economic forces, and the simple notion of wanting to 
spend your life with the person you love.143 
Proponents also point out that if the entire purpose of marriage is to 
procreate, then infertile individuals should equally be denied the ability 
to marry.144 Having children should be a requirement for obtaining a 
marriage license similar to a blood test.145 If a couple indicated that they 
were unwilling to conceive a child, then they should be denied a 
marriage license on par with a same-sex couple.146 
As to the sodomy debate, the metaphoric wind has been taken out 
of the sails of this argument through the case of Lawrence v. Texas.147 
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Rarely does the United States Supreme Court completely overturn its 
own precedent.148 Yet, even more unusual is the relatively short amount 
of time between the Bowers decision and the Lawrence decision.149 
Bowers was decided in 1986.150 The Court overturned the Bowers 
decision in the Lawrence case in 2003, less than twenty years later.151 
In Lawrence, John Lawrence entertained two gay acquaintances in 
his home near Houston, Texas in September 1998.152 The two 
acquaintances had been in a romantic relationship with each other prior 
to that evening but had broken-off the relationship.153 This enabled 
Lawrence and one of the individuals to engage in sexual relations that 
evening.154 This infuriated the other man.155 Seeking revenge, he called 
the police and reported “a black male going crazy with a gun” at 
Lawrence’s apartment.156 Four deputies arrived at the scene; however, 
instead of finding a crazy, gun wielding black man, they found Lawrence 
having anal sex in his bedroom with the other man.157 A second officer 
reported seeing them engaged in oral sex, and two others did not report 
seeing the pair having sexual intercourse.158 Upset, Lawrence argued 
with the police for entering his home.159 
At the time, Texas’s anti-sodomy statute read that “homosexual 
conduct” was a misdemeanor and consisted of someone who “engages in 
deviant sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”160 
As such, law enforcement arrested Lawrence for “deviate sex”.161 
At the trial level, Lawrence pled no contest to the charges and was 
fined.162 He then appealed his conviction to a three-judge panel of the 
Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals.163  The Court heard the case on 
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November 3, 1999, and found the statute unconstitutional.164 A majority 
of judges ruled that the law violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the 
Texas Constitution, which bars discrimination based on sex, race, color, 
creed, or national origin.165 The Court of Appeals decided to review the 
case en banc and on March 15, 2001, the appellate court reversed the 
three-judge panel’s decision.166 Lawrence’s attorneys sought review by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest appellate court in 
Texas.167 After a year’s delay, on April 17, 2002, the request was 
denied.168 
On July 16, 2002, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed with 
the United States Supreme Court.169 The Court accepted jurisdiction.170 
Presented to the Justices were three questions of great importance: 
1. Whether the petitioners’ criminal convictions under the Texas 
‘Homosexual Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy 
by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex 
couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws?  2. Whether the petitioners’ criminal 
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their home 
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?  3. Whether 
Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled?171 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion overturning Bowers.172 Kennedy 
and the concurring Justices specifically found that homosexuals had a 
protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity.173 
Furthermore, the sexual and moral choices of homosexuals enjoyed 
constitutional protection.174 The majority’s moral disapproval of an 
activity did not provide a legitimate justification for the criminalization 
of sodomy.175 
“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making 
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their private sexual conduct a crime[,]”176 Kennedy wrote. In reaching 
the decision, the Court reviewed many of the arguments made by the 
court in Bowers.177 The Court stated the belief that “[c]ondemnation of 
[homosexual practices] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and 
ethical standards.”178 It also examined the legislative history that 
criminalized certain sexual practices, and cited the Model Penal Code’s 
recommendations since 1955, the Wolfenden Report of 1963, and a 1981 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights.179 
However, the majority concluded that intimate, adult, consensual 
conduct whether sexual or not, constituted a liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process protections.180 Kennedy stated the 
Constitution protects “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, [and] child rearing” and 
that homosexuals “may seek autonomy for these purposes.”181 
What is a marriage? 
A third issue that has arisen from the same-sex marriage debate is 
the definition of a marriage to begin with.182 In a sense, opponents of 
same-sex marriage believe the protection and integrity of the traditional 
definition of marriage should be a compelling government interest.183 
Such an argument is so novel, yet, so important to the concept of equal 
protection jurisprudence that it deserves special attention. 
While several jurisdictions have implied protecting the “traditional” 
definition of marriage is of the utmost importance, none have been as 
straight forward as the State of Utah in the case of Kitchen v. Herbert.184 
The case focused on the same-sex couple of Derek Kitchen and Moudi 
Sbeity.185 The two had been in a monogamous, committed relationship 
for several years while living in Salt Lake City, Utah.186 Despite applying 
for and being denied a marriage license, the two sought recognition of 
their relationship from one of the most conservative states in the 
Country187 
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In March 2013, Kitchen, along with other same-sex couple 
plaintiffs sued the Governor and Attorney General of Utah, as well as the 
clerk of Salt Lake County, in their official capacities.188 Their suit 
challenged three provisions of Utah law relating to same-sex marriage.189 
First, Utah Code section 30–1–2(5) reads marriages that are “prohibited 
and declared void” are those “between persons of the same sex.”190  
Second, in 2004, the Utah Legislature passed section 30–1–4.1, which 
read: 
(1)(a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only 
the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter. 
(b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a 
woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not 
recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any 
legal status, rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially 
equivalent to those provided under Utah law to a man and a 
woman because they are married. 
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) impairs any contract or other 
rights, benefits, or duties that are enforceable independently of 
this section.191 
Finally, the State Legislature provided a proposed constitutional 
amendment to its electorate, known as Amendment Three.192 It states: 
“(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a 
woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be 
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent 
legal effect.”193 Amendment Three passed with approximately sixty-six 
percent (66%) of the vote and became section twenty-nine of Article I of 
the Utah Constitution.194 
After dealing with some preliminary questions, the Tenth Circuit 
espoused on the definition of marriage over the years. It started its 
examination with the 1972 United States Supreme Court case of Baker v. 
Nelson.195 There, the Court upheld a ban on same-sex marriage and 
defined the concept as “[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man 
and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children 
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within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis” and that “[t]he due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for 
restructuring [the institution of marriage] by judicial legislation.”196 In 
regards to the Equal Protection argument, the Court wrote “[t]here is no 
irrational or invidious discrimination” because “in commonsense and in a 
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital 
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental 
difference in sex.”197 
This analysis honed in on the State of Utah’s main argument.198 In 
rejecting requests to approve samesex marriages, the State believed it 
was preserving the traditional definition of the term.199 The State argued 
that the term “marriage” by its nature prevented same-sex couples from 
marrying.200 Citing the Glucksberg201 decision, Utah believed that the 
court’s opinion depended upon the development of a “‘careful 
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,’ relying on ‘[o]ur 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices [to] provide the crucial 
guideposts for responsible decision making.’”202 
The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim, reasoning that if the Court 
was restricted to defining marriage based upon its historical application, 
not only would same sex couples be denied the right to marry, but so 
would interracial couples.203 
To claim that marriage, by definition, excludes certain couples is 
simply to insist that those couples may not marry because they 
have historically been denied the right to do so.  One might just 
as easily have argued that interracial couples are by definition 
excluded from the institution of marriage.  But ‘neither history 
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.’204 
The Court also referred to the Lawrence decision,205 reminding the 
State of Utah that the moral majority is not how the law is defined but 
rather a starting point for an equal protection analysis.206 With this in 
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mind, the Tenth Circuit found Utah’s ban unconstitutional.207 This 
decision clearly stands for the proposition that defending tradition is not 
a compelling government interest.208 This is especially true when that 
tradition stands for centuries of discrimination and bigotry. 
BRENNER V. SCOTT, 999 F. SUPP. 2D 1278 (N.D. FLA. 2014). 
The Brenner case consisted of twenty-two different plaintiffs from 
two consolidated cases, which included nine same sex couples.209 Many 
of these couples were legally married in various jurisdictions such as 
New York, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, and 
Canada.210 There was also a surviving spouse of a New York same-sex 
marriage and two individuals who had been in a same-sex relationship 
for fifteen years wishing to marry in Florida.211 Judge Robert Lewis 
Hinkle heard the case.212 
The namesake of the case was James D. Brenner (“Mr. Brenner”) 
who wanted to marry his partner Charles D. Jones (“Mr. Jones”).213 Mr. 
Brenner had been an employee of the State of Florida since 1981 and Mr. 
Jones worked for the Florida Department of Education since 2003.214 The 
parties married in Canada in 2009, however, the State of Florida refused 
to recognize the marriage.215 By doing this, the State would be denying 
retirement benefits to Mr. Jones after Mr. Brenner’s death.216 
The defendants consisted of five different entities and 
individuals.217 Brenner sued the Governor, the Attorney General, the 
Surgeon General, the Secretary of the Department of Management 
Services, and the Clerk of Court of Washington County, Florida.218 All 
defendants were sued in their official capacities.219 In Brenner’s view, 
they all played a part in denying him the ability to marry in Florida.220 
Brenner argued that Florida’s ban on same-sex marriage violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
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Clauses.221 More specifically, Brenner’s challenge, as to the Equal 
Protection claim, argued that the ban discriminated based on sexual 
orientation.222 He also argued that his First Amendment right of 
association had been infringed upon.223 
Brenner challenged Article I, section twenty-seven, of the Florida 
Constitution, and Florida Statutes section 741.212 and section 
741.04(1).224 Article I, section twenty-seven provides: “Marriage 
defined—Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and 
one woman as husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as 
marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or 
recognized.”225 Florida Statutes section 741.212 provides: 
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in 
any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, 
the United States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or 
foreign, or any other place or location, or relationships between 
persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages in any 
jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, the 
United States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or 
foreign, or any other place or location, are not recognized for any 
purpose in this state. 
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not 
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
state, territory, possession, or tribe of the United States or of any 
other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place 
or location respecting either a marriage or relationship not 
recognized under subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a 
marriage or relationship. 
(3) For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term 
“marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the term “spouse” applies only 
to a member of such a union.226 
Florida Statutes section 741.04(1) provides, “[n]o county court 
judge or clerk of the circuit court in this state shall issue a license for the 
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marriage of any person . . . unless one party is male and the other party is 
female.”227 
Initially, the State countered by filing a motion to dismiss.228 It 
argued that Mr. Brenner lacked standing to bring forth the suit and that 
the defendant’s names were improper.229 The Court agreed in part with 
this motion, dismissing the complaint against the Governor and the 
Attorney General.230 Yet, the court remarked, “[i]f it turns out later that 
complete relief cannot be afforded against the Secretary and Surgeon 
General, any necessary and proper additional defendant can be added.”231 
With this resolved, the court turned to the merits of Mr. Brenner’s 
argument.232 First, the court focused on a state’s rights concern.233 In 
part, Governor Scott asserted that the decision to deny or permit same 
sex-marriage was solely in the prevue of the state government.234 The 
federal government could not interfere with such a decision.235 The court 
quickly pointed to the Loving case as a prime example where the federal 
government could and had interfered with the state’s right to police 
marriage.236 The Court remarked that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
been created after the Civil War: 
for the express purpose of protecting rights against encroachment 
by state governments.  By that time it was well established that a 
federal court had the authority—indeed, the duty—to strike down 
an unconstitutional statute when necessary to the decision in a 
case or controversy properly before the court. The State of 
Florida has itself asked federal courts to do so.  So the suggestion 
that this is just a federalism case—that the state’s laws are 
beyond review in federal court—is a nonstarter.237 
Next, the Court reverted to a traditional examination of 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.238 The first step was to 
determine the proper test in deciding if discrimination by the state was 
proper.239 This focused on the issue of whether the right to marry was a 
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fundamental right under the Constitution.240 Citing the Loving case, the 
Court found clearly it was.241 In fact, since the Loving case courts, in 
several jurisdictions repeatedly found that the right to marry was 
fundamental.242 “Indeed, the Court has sometimes listed marriage as the 
very paradigm of a fundamental right.”243 
With this established, the next step was to determine if the State of 
Florida’s ban would pass strict scrutiny.244 Under equal protection 
jurisprudence, the government can discriminate against a fundamental 
right through means that are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.245 As to what compelling state interest Florida had in continuing 
with its same sex marriage ban, the state resorted to the procreation 
argument used by most other jurisdictions.246 The Court rejected this 
argument.247 It found no historical precedent where Florida required 
procreation as a condition of marriage.248  The evidence as to this issue 
was clear as individuals who are medically unable to procreate, who are 
beyond child-bearing age, and individuals who voluntarily or 
involuntarily become medically unable to procreate, are allowed to marry 
and remain married.249 “In short, the notion that procreation is an 
essential element of a Florida marriage blinks reality.”250 
The Court went so far as to imply that the procreation argument 
was a “pretext” and the true argument against same-sex marriage focused 
on a moral disapproval of the practice.251 “The undeniable truth is that 
the Florida ban on same-sex marriage stems entirely, or almost entirely, 
from moral disapproval of the practice.”252 Falling back on the Lawrence 
decision, the court reminded the State that the moral majority does not 
                                                                                                                                     
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See id. at 1288. 
 243 Id.; see, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (refusing to recognize assisted suicide as 
a fundamental right, listing rights that do qualify as fundamental, and placing the right to 
marry first on the list); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (including 
the right to marry in the fundamental right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942) (labeling marriage “one of the basic civil rights of 
man”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (saying that “[w]ithout doubt” the 
right “to marry” is within the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, (1888) (labeling marriage “the most important relation in life”). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
 246 Id. 
 247 See id. at 1289. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 1289. 
 251 See Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. 
 252 Id. 
2015] The Same Sex Marriage Debate for Dummies 69 
constitute a compelling state interest.253 As such, the court found 
Florida’s ban unconstitutional.254 
FLORIDA’S FUTURE 
On August 21, 2014, the court issued a preliminary injunction 
forbidding the State of Florida from banning same-sex marriage.255 Yet 
in the same breath, the Court temporarily stayed the injunction until it 
was decided if the three same-sex marriage cases that at that time had 
petitioned for the United States Supreme Court to hear them would be 
heard (Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen) and for ninety-one days thereafter.256 
In the meantime, the State appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.257 
However, on October 7, 2014, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the request to hear Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen.258 Soon after, 
Mr. Brenner filed a motion requesting Judge Hinkle to lift his stay before 
the ninety-one-day period under the original order.259 The State objected 
and Judge Hinkle rejected Mr. Brenner’s request on November 5, 
2014.260 
On November 19, 2014, the State asked the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals to extend Judge Hinkle’s stay pending appeal.261 On 
December 3, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit refused that request.262 On 
December 15, 2014, the State renewed its request to the Eleventh Circuit, 
to stay Judge Hinkle’s preliminary injunction.263 Florida’s Attorney 
General, Pam Bondi, made her request based upon the need for 
uniformity within the state.264 Specifically, she argued that Judge 
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Hinkle’s ruling only applied to Washington County, the named defendant 
in the suit, and not the sixty-six other clerks throughout the state.265 On 
December 19, 2014 this request was denied.266 
On December 23, 2014, the Washington County Clerk of Court 
filed an emergency motion asking for clarification of Hinkle’s order.267 
Did the clerk need to issue a marriage license only to Brenner plaintiffs 
or to all same-sex marriage couples?268 On December 24, 2014, Judge 
Hinkle issued an order, which stated his injunction applied to “the 
Secretary of the Department of Management Services, the Surgeon 
General, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—
and others in active concert or participation with any of them.”269 A 
deadline of December 29, 2014 was provided for the Secretary to argue 
the effect of the original injunction.270 On January 1, 2015, Judge Hinkle 
explained the scope of his injunction, writing that the Florida 
Constitution requires all Florida clerks to issue licenses to same-sex 
couples, and that while clerks are free to interpret his ruling differently, 
they should anticipate lawsuits if they fail to issue such licenses.271 
The preliminary injunction now in effect thus does not require 
the Clerk to issue licenses to other applicants.  But as set out 
in the order that announced issuance of the preliminary 
injunction, the Constitution requires the Clerk to issue such 
licenses.  As in any other instance involving parties not now 
before the court, the Clerk’s obligation to follow the law arises 
from sources other than the preliminary injunction.272 
On January 6, 2015, Judge Hinkle’s stay ended and same-sex 
marriages began throughout Florida.273 While all clerks issued licenses to 
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same-sex couples on this date, clerks in thirteen counties–Baker, 
Calhoun, Clay, Duval, Franklin, Holmes, Jackson, Liberty, Okaloosa, 
Pasco, Santa Rosa, Wakulla, and Washington–indicated that they would 
no longer provide courthouse wedding services to avoid having to 
officiate at the wedding of same-sex couples.274 Officially, this was done 
to spare the awkwardness for clerk personnel.275 
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS? 
At the time of writing this article, the Brenner case sits before the 
Eleventh Circuit awaiting further argument.276 However, on January 16, 
2015, the United States Supreme Court announced it would hear cases 
involving same-sex marriage from four other circuits.277 Two questions 
will be decided by the Court.278 The first is whether same-sex marriage is 
or is not legal—more specifically, does the Equal Protection Clause 
invalidate same-sex marriage bans?279 The second question focuses on 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.280 Here, the Court will decide whether a 
state has to honor same-sex marriages from other states?281 Both 
questions will strike at the very heart of the same sex marriage debate. 
Many legal scholars believe the decision will rest on the shoulders 
of Justice Anthony Kennedy.282 At seventy-six years old, no one knows 
exactly how Justice Kennedy will vote; yet, many believe that based on 
his prior record, it is likely he will fall in favor of same-sex marriages.283 
However, no one can know for sure. Justice Kennedy has spoken often of 
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his belief that government should have “dignity” for gay individuals.284 
While at the same time, as a President Reagan appointee, he is a staunch 
supporter of state’s rights over the federal government.285 Only time will 
tell if this one swing vote will alter the course of history for 
approximately nine million Americans who identify themselves as gay or 
lesbian.286 
CONCLUSION 
It is quite possible that by the time this article is published, the 
debate will be over and gay marriage will fade into the history books as 
the Twenty-First Century’s First Civil Rights Movement. But whether 
gays and lesbians marry, whether the “traditional” definition of marriage 
survives, the depth and breadth of equal protection jurisprudence has 
been changed forever. Courts in all states, and at all levels, now have 
more guidance than ever in defining fundamental rights. No longer are 
we limited to a strict reading of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or 
individual state mandates to define this concept. We now have precedent 
from several courts expanding the traditional idea of liberty. 
Maybe, fundamental rights are so innate, so truly basic, that it is 
impossible to list all of them in the volumes of American legal 
jurisprudence. Like legal scholars say of the United States’ Constitution; 
it is a living, breathing document, which is constantly changing.287 But 
perhaps the life breathed into the document comes from those strong 
enough to stand up for themselves against the majority. Perhaps the 
change is not in what the document says, but in what we as “the people” 
are willing to ask from it. 
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